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ERRATUM 
Wherever the· word "Trans." appears in this brief, it 
should be corrected to read "Record." 
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5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgement entered by the Dis-
trict Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Utah, in and for Washington County, against the defend-
ant Bloomington Irrigation Company and in favor of the 
plaintiff Santa Clara Seep Ditch Company. 
The facts which the appellant, Bloomington Irrigation 
Company, relies on in this appeal are those found by the 
Court in its Findings of Fact (Trans. 35), the pertinent por-
tions of which are as follows: 
1. (Trans. 35) That the plaintiff is an irrigation 
company organized under and by virtue of the laws of the 
State of Utah, with its principal place of business at St. 
George, Utah, that Henry Bowler one of the Defendants 
herein is the duly appointed water commissioner for the 
Santa Clara Rivier or Creek, and the Bloomington Irriga-
tion Company, sometimes called the Bloomington Canal 
Company is an irrigation company duly organized under 
the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of 
business at St. George, Utah. 
2. (Trans. 35) That the Plaintiff has a primary 
right, initiated prior to 1890, in the waters of Santa Clara 
Creek to use 3.98 c.f.s. for irrigating 239 acres of land be-
longing to Plaintiff's stockholders and lying south and 
southwesterly from St. George City. 
3. (Trans. 36) That the Defendant Bloomington 
Irrigation Company also known as the Bloomington Canal 
Company, has a primary right initiated prior to 1890, in the 
waters of Santa Clara Creek to use 3.28 c.f.s. for irrigation 
of 196.7 acres of land on Bloomington Bench, southerly 
about two miles from Plaintiff's lands. 
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4. (Trans. 36) That Defendant company also has a 
primary right initiated in 1876 to divert water from the 
Virgin River for use upon the same 196.7 acres. 
5. (Trans. 36) That said rights have been hereto-
fore adjudicated and declared in general adjudication suits 
in this court involving respectively the Santa Clara Creek 
and the Virgin River, the Santa Clara decree being dated 
November 6, 1922, (Trans 58) and the Virgin River decree 
December 12, 1925. (Trans. 56). 
6. (Trans. 36) That the Virgin River decree recites 
that the Santa Clara Creek is a tributary of the Virgin 
River and that the rights in said creek have been deter-
mined previously by court decree and are therefore not in-
cluded in the Virgin River determination. 
7. (Trans. 36) That said Virgin River decree pro-
vides with respect to Defendant's right in the Virgin River 
that said right is to be used as a supplementary supply to 
the right granted to said company from the Santa Clara 
River. 
8. (Trans. 36) That in low water season the waters 
of Santa Clara Creek are insufficient to supply in full the 
rights of Plaintiff and Defendant. That the diversions of 
Plaintiff and Defendant are the lowest diversions on said 
creek. That the diversion point of the Plaintiff is located 
approximately a mile and a quarter up stream from the 
diversion point of the Defendant as described in the Santa 
Clara decree. 1 
9. (Trans. 36) That Plaintiff diverts its water into J 
what is known as the Seep Ditch which ditch roughly par- 1 
allels Santa Clara Creek channel for some distance and then 
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extends northeasterly and then easterly to a point 600 feet 
west from a street or lane known as Silo Street which runs 
south from St. George City. 
10. (Trans. 37) That the lands irrigated from Plain-
tiff's appropFiation are located south of said Seep Ditch 
and between said ditch and the Santa Clara Creek and Vir-
gin River. That the slope of the country in said area is to 
the south, and seepage and surplus waters from said area 
irrigated from the Seep Ditch would, if not diverted, drain 
into the Santa Clara Creek or the Virgin River. 
12. (Trans. 37) That Defendant's Exhibit "A" illus-
trates the location of the diversion ditch of the Plaintiff 
known as the Seep Ditch, the location of the Defendant's 
diversion canal known as the Bloomington Canal, the loca-
tion of the natural channel or creek bed of Santa Clara 
Creek, the Virgin River bed, and the location of the Defend-
ant's ditch for diverting water out of the Virgin River. 
13. (Trans. 37) That Defendant's Virgin River 
ditch extends approximately one mile roughly parallel to 
the Virgin River bed. That the greater part of the area 
irrigated from Plaintiff's ditch lies north of said Virgin 
River ditch and seepage and surplus waters drain from said 
lands into said Virgin River ditch and thence flow into De .. 
fendant's canal. That all such seepage and surplus water 
entering said Virgin River ditch enter it below the point of 
diversion described for Defendant in the Santa Clara decree·. 
14. (Trans. 38) That the amount of such seepage 
and surplus waters received into Defendant's canal from 
the area irrigated from Plaintiff's ditch fluctuates and dur-
ing the low water season when the waters of the Santa 
Clara Creek are insufficient to satisfy the decreed rights 
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of Plaintiff and Defendant, the flow of such seepage and 
surplus waters is so small as to be difficult and costly to 
measure and cannot be accurately measured when waters 
of the Virgin River are flowing in said river ditch. 
15. (Trans. 38) That some seepage and surplus 
waters flow into said Virgin River ditch which originate 
from sources other than the Seep Ditch or Santa Clara 
Creek, but during the low-water season the amount of 
such inflow from other sources is so small as to be of no 
consequence herein. 
16. (Trans. 38) That Defendant's diversion from 
the Virgin River is approximately. at a point where the 
river is very flat, wide and sandy to an unknown depth, 
and it is impossible at any reasonable cost to maintain a 
permanent diversion dam or diversion works to continously 
divert water into Defendant's canal. That therefore De-
fendant cannot depend upon a continous flow into its canal 
from said Virgin River. That the Defendant depends upon 
brush dams to divert water into its. canal at low water sea-
son and such dams are frequently washed out by freshets 
in said river caused by thunder storms in the latter part 
of June and in July, August and September. That such 
freshets also frequently fill the upper part of the diversion 
ditch with silt which must be removed by sluicing or dredg-
ing. ~ 
17. (Trans. 39) That subsequent appropriators have 
approved applications for appropriation of waters from the 
Virgin River, and some of these convey water through 
the Defendant's Virgin River Ditch and the Bloomington 
canal. That waters flowing iil the Bloomington canal in 
June, July and September as reported by the watermaster 
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and set forth in paragraph 22 below included water being 
diverted for use by such subsequent appropriators, but the 
rights of such subsequent appropriators are in each case 
subsequent and inferior to the rights of the Defendant as 
a primary appropriator from said Virgin River. 
24. (Trans. 41) That the decree in the Santa Clara 
Creek general adjudication which sets forth the rights of 
the Plaintiff and Defendant above mentioned, contains the 
following recitals: 
"The parties hereto and their successors in interest 
shall promptly install and perpetually maintain 
suitable and efficient head-gates, control works, 
and measuring devices at or near their respective 
points of diversion and all water herein allowed 
and decreed shall be measured at or near said points 
of diversion." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The errors relied upon by the defendant and appellant 
Bloomington Irrigation Company for a reversal of the 
judgment are that the court erred: 
1. In ordering in paragraph 1 of the judgment that 
the defendant and appellant be charged with return flow 
waters received by it below the point decreed as its point 
of diversion from the Santa Clara Creek channel. 
2. In paragraphs 2 and 3 of its judgment which said 
paragraphs are so vague and uncertain as not to admit of 
enforcement and therefore are void. 
3. In paragraph 3 of its judgment in that said para-
graph purports to affect water rights in the Virgin River, 
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the court not having before it the necessary parties to 
give it jurisdiction to adjudicate such rights. 
4. In paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of said judgment in that 
said paragraphs substantially modify and revise the final 
decree in the general adjudication suit upon the Santa Clara 
Creek, the issues finally decided in said decree being res 
judicata as to this action. 
5. In paragraph 4 of its judgment denying the defend-
ant and appellant the relief asked in its answer and counter-
claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
Appellant contends that in charging it with return flow 
waters received below its decreed point of diversion from 
the Santa Clara Creek channel the court took a position 
contrary to the established law of this state and a position 
which would make the administering of the waters of any 
river system difficult if not impossible. 
Section 73-5-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953 requires the 
installation of water measuring devices at EACH POINT 
WHERE WATER IS DIVERTED OR TURNED OUT, the 
statute clearly contemplating that water should be meas-
ured at the point of diversion and not at the place of use. In 
addition to this statutory direction the appellant empha-
sizes the fact that the Santa Clara Creek Decree (Trans. 
58) expressly provides: 
"The parties hereto and their successors in interest 
shall promptly install and perpetually maintain suit- .~ 
able and efficient head-gates, control works, and 
measuring devices at or near their respective points 
of diversion and all water herein allo~d and de· 
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creed shall be measured at or near said points of 
diversion." 
In ordering that the appellant be charged with return 
flow waters received by it below its decreed point of diver-
sion the court necessarily required that the waters used by 
the appellant be measured not at or near its point of diver-
sion but rather at some undetermined place between its 
point of diversion and the place of use of the water. In this 
respect the court's order is not only contrary to the estab-
lished law of this state but also is in direct conflict with the · 
express provisions of the final general adjudication decree 
on the Santa Clara Creek. It would seem apparent that any 
attempt to measure water at any place other than its point 
of diversion would result in hopeless confusion and an im-
possible task for the water commissioner charged with that 
responsibility. Under such a theory the commissioner would 
be forced to adjust the amount of water diverted according 
to the rapidly changing amounts of seepage water coming 
into a user's ditch from irrigated land above him. 
In Wrathall vs. Jobnson 40 Pac. (2nd) 755, 86 Utah 
50, this court declared that ... "the state is vitally interest-
ed in seeing that none of the waters are allowed to run 
to waste or go without being applied to a beneficial use." 
... In furtherance of this principle this court has held in an 
unbroken line of decisions that a lower user can gather and 
use seepage and waste water from irrigated lands above. 
Robert vs. Gribble 134 Pac. 1014, 43 Utah 411; Wrathall 
vs. Johnson, 40 Pac. (2nd) 755, 86 Utah 50; Wellsville East 
Field Irrigation Company vs. Lindsay Land and Livestock 
Company 137 Pac. (2nd) 634, 104 Utah 448; Smithfield . 
West Bench Irrigation Company vs. Union Central Life In-
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surance Company 142 Pac. (2nd) 866, 105 Utah 468. These 
cases are based upon the sound principle favoring the great-
est possible utilization of the State's water resources and 
upon the theory that once water has been diverted 
from its natural channel, used upon the lands of an appro-
priator and then turned loose, it is fugitive water and sub- <, 
ject to use by anyone unless and until it gets back into its 
original natural channel. By charging the appellant with 
return flow waters received in its ditch below its point of 
diversion the court in effect prevented the appellant from 
making full utilization of the water available during the 
dry season because the appellant will have charged against 
it at its point of diversion any return flow or seepage water 
collected in its ditch below that point. Therefore the appel-
lant in this case and many water users in similar circum-
stances, are better off allowing the seepage water to run 
to waste rather than maintaining costly ditches to collect it. 
POINT 2. ~ 
In attacking paragraphs 2 and 3 of the court's judg-
ment {Trans. 44) the appellants rely upon the rule of law 
that . . . "a decree so indefinite and uncertain that it is 
impossible to determine the quantity or portion of water to 
be awarded is fatally defective" ... Sharp vs. Whitmore 
168 Pac. 273, 51 Utah 14. "One of the essentials of a valid 
judgment is that the judgement be valid and certain re-
specting the relief granted. In judgments defining and de-
terming conflicting claims, rights and interest in and to 
the use of water in this arid region the application of the ;, 
foregoing rule is in.dispensable." Sharp vs. Whitmore, supra. -~'· 
These rules of law were reiterated by this court in Garri-
son vs. Davis 54 Pac. {2nd) 439, 88 Utah 358. Paragraph 2 
! 
: 
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of the court's judgment (Trans. 45) in this case requires 
the water commissioner to ascertain when the appellant 
is entitled to draw water from the Virgin River and at the 
same time par;;tgraph 3 of the judgment by necessary im-
plication requires the appellant to use Virgin River water 
when available unless its diverting works have been washed 
out or made ineffecth·e without fault of the appellant. In 
these two paragraphs of the judgment the water commis-
sioner is therefore instructed first to ascertain when the ap-
pellant is entitled to draw water from the Virgin River and 
second is instructed by implication that the appellant is re-
quired to use Virgin River water unless it has been at fault 
in maintaining its diverting works. Any attempt by the 
water commissioner of the Virgin or Santa Clara Rivers to 
administer these two paragraphs of the judgment would 
inevitably result in hopeless conflict and confusion. These 
provisions of the judgment are clearly so vague and uncer-
tain as not to admit of enforcement and therefore ought 
to be declared void. 
Appellant contends that the Virgin River Decree 
(Trans. 56) merely gives the appellant right to use Virgin 
River water to the extent necessary to make up its 3.28 
c.f.s. of water awarded by the Santa Clara Decree when it 
cannot be satisfied from the waters of Santa Clara Creek. 
This is the only logical interpretation which can be given 
to the Virgin River Decree and is the only interpretation 
which will save that decree from being so vague and un-
certain as not to admit of enforcement. Any other interpre-
tation of the Virgin River Decree would award an entirely 
uncertain and indefinite amount of Virgin River water to 
the appellant. 
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POINT 3. 
By the necessary implication contained in paragraph 
three of the judgment to the effect that the appellant must 
use Virgin River water unless its diverting works have been 
washed out or made ineffective without fault of the appel-
lant, the court has directly affected water rights in the Vir-
gin River. It is elementary law that water rights like any 
other vested rights cannot be interfered with except by a 
court having jurisdiction under the pleadings and parties 
before it to adjudicate such rights, Tanner vs. Bacon, 136 
Pac. (2nd) 957, 103 Utah 494. In this case none of the users 
of Virgin River water, except appellant, were before the 
court and consequently the judgment could not operate to 
bind other Virgin River water users. Paragraph 3 of the 
judgment therefore deprives the appellant of vested rights 
in the Santa Clara Creek and purports to substitute in 
place thereof rights in the Virgin River which the court 
was without jurisdiction to award. 
POINT 4. \4 
The Santa Clara Creek Decree (Trans. 58) became a 
final and conclusive decree upon its entry by the court on 
the 6th day of November, 1922. The Virgin River Decree 
(Trans. 56) was entered by the court more than three years 
later, to-wit, December 12, 1925. The Santa Clara Creek 
Decree makes no mention of any limitation or restriction 
upon the rights awarded to the appellant thereby and the 
court in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the judgmenrt in this case 
modifies and revises this decree in two respects, viz.: (1) 
Contrary to the provisions of the decree the judgement re-
quires the measuring of the waters of the Santa Clara 
Creek used by the appellant at a point below its decreed 
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point of diversion. (2) The judgment requires the appellant 
to use or make an effort to use Virgin River water before 
it is entitled to its decreed rights in the Santa Clara Creek. 
In making these substantial modifications and revisions 
in the appellant's rights under the Santa Clara Creek De-
cree (Trans. 58) the court violated the well settled princi-
ple of law that "where there has been no retention of juris-
diction by the trial court, unaided by statute, it has no 
power after the expiration of the term and certainly after 
the time for appeal has expired to change or modify its 
judgement in a substantial or material respect," Frost vs. 
The District Court of the First Judicial District, 83 Pac. 
(2nd) 737, 96 Utah 115. 
POINT 5. 
In accordance with the principles of law heretofore 
set forth in this brief, the appellant contends that the 
court ought to have ordered the State Engineer and the 
water commissioner of the Santa Clara Creek to distribute 
to the defendant and appellant, Bloomington Irrigation 
Company, its decreed portion of the waters of the Santa 
Clara Creek in accordance with paragraph 9 of the decree 
entered in the case of St. George Clara Field Canal Com-
pany vs. Newcastle Reclamation Company (Trans. 58) and 
that the appellant ought to have been allowed to prove its 
damages as a result of being denied the waters of the Santa 
Clara Creek after June 9, 1951, and to recover judgment 
against the plaintiff and respondent for the same. 
The defendant and appellant concludes therefore that 
the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and 
the case remanded to the lower court with instructions to 
enter judgment ordering the State Engineer and the water 
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commissioner of the Santa Clara Creek to distribute to the ·: 
appellant, Bloomington Irrigation Company, its decreed ~ 
portion of the waters of the Santa Clara Creek in accord- ·.; 
ance with paragraph 9 of the decree entered in the case1·, 
of St. George Clara Field Canal Company vs. Newcastle·: 
Reclamation Company and with the further instruction that. 
the .lower court grant the appellant a hearing as to the 
question of damages sustained by it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COX & ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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